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#2A-6/4/81 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF PERINTON, 
Employer, 
-and-
ICE,.OIL, CONSTRUCTION & SUPPLY DRIVERS & 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
ALLIED WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 39 8, : CASE NO. C-2218 
Petitioner. : 
On February 17, 1981, the Ice, Oil, Construction & Supply 
Drivers & Allied Workers, Local Union No. 398 (petitioner) filed, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition for certification as the 
exclusive negotiating representative of certain employees employed 
by the Town of Perinton (employer). The parties executed a 
consent agreement which was approved by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation on April 20, 1981. The 
negotiating unit stipulated to therein was as follows: 
Included: All full-time employees in the Highway 
and Sewer Departments of the Town of 
Perinton"s Department of Public Works 
in the following titles: Motor equip-
ment operators, laborers, laborers 
(utility inspectors), mechanics, and 
working foremen. 
Excluded: Commissioner of Public Works, Highway 
Superintendent,. Deputy Highway Super-
intendent, Sewer Department Superinten-
dent, guards, office clerical employees 
and all other employees of the employer. 
Board - C-2218 
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Pursuant to the consent agreement, an election was held on 
May 14, 1981. The results of the election indicate that the 
majority of eligible voters in the stipulated unit who cast valid 
ballots do not desire to be represented for purposes of collec-
tive negotiations by the petitioner.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
June 4, 1981 
ZdUuL^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
avid C.'Randies./Member 
There were 23 ballots cast in favor of and 27 ballots against 
representation by the petitioner. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
CITY OF ALBANY, : BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
Respondent, : 
-and-
: Case No. U-5399 
EDWIN ST. PIERRE, 
. Charging Party. 
On May 19, 1981, the City of Albany filed a notice of appeal 
from the ruling of the hearing officer denying its motion for par-
ticularization of the improper practice charge in the proceeding 
now pending before him. The City asks, in effect, that the Board 
exercise its discretion under its Rules and authorize the appeal. 
It asserts, in support of its request, that it is unable to frame 
an answer or to prepare a defense to the charge in its present 
form, and that the charging party will not be prejudiced. 
The charging party has filed an affidavit in opposition to 
the request on the ground that he has provided all the information 
needed by the City of Albany to frame, an answer and to prepare a 
defense. He also objects to consideration of the appeal at this 
time on the ground that the interlocutory ruling of the hearing 
officer does not prejudice the City of Albany. 
Having reviewed the papers submitted by both parties, we 
find no reason to depart from normal practice by authorizing in 
this instance an immediate appeal from the interlocutory ruling 
of the hearing officer. Accordingly, 
Board - U-5399 
WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and' it hereby is, dis-
missed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
June 4, 1981 
zA 
Ida Klaus, Member 
6U<m. 
David C Randies, MemBer 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
SO WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY. NEW YORK 12205 
MINUTES OF THE BOARD MEETING 
June 5, 1981 
New York, New York „__.„ 
PRESENT: HAROLD R. NEWMAN, Chairman 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
DAVID C. RANDLES, Member 
Staff: Jerome Lefkowitz, Deputy Chairman 
Ann Pociluk, Secretary to the Board 
1. Board Decisions and Orders 
A. U-4809 - In the Matter of Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 580, Respondent, 
and Perry Tarquinio, Charging Party (//1A-6/5/81) . 
B. U-4699 - In the Matter of Elmira Teachers Assoication Association, NYSUT, 
AFL-CIO, Respondent, and Gene Carr, Charging Party (#lB-6/5/81). 
C. U-4346 - In the Matter of Rochester City School District, Respondent, and 
Rochester Teachers Association, Charging Party (//1C-6/5/81). 
D. U-5115 - In the Matter of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Niagara Chapter, Respondent, and Town of Niagara, Charging Party (#1D-
6/5/81). 
2. Board Discussions 
A. C-2136 - Board of Education of the City of Buffalo, Buffalo Board of Educ. 
Professional Clerical and Tchnical Employees' Assn. and Local 264, AFSCME -
The Board discussed the proposed draft decision in this proceeding and 
requested some revisions be made. The Deputy Chairman will prepare a 
revised draft for the next meeting of the Board. 
B. D-0189 - Local 252, Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO -
The Board discussed the matters involved in this proceeding and requested 
some research be done regarding some of the matters discussed. The Deputy 
Chairman will provide a research memorandum and further discussions will 
be held at the next meeting of the Board. 
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2. Board Discussions (continued) 
C. C-2271/E-0752 - Long Island Rail Road Company - Board Members Klaus and 
Randies noted that the Long Island Railroad unions have moved the United 
States Supreme Court for certiorari to review the decision of the Second 
Circuit holding that the Long Island Railroad is under the jurisdiction 
of the Taylor Law for at least some purposes. They also noted that the 
decision of the Second Circuit is not clear as to the extent of Taylor 
Law jurisdiction and that the National Mediation Board has interpreted 
that decision as limiting Taylor Law jurisdiction to matters involving 
"the~resolution-of^negot:iatxon-disput:es.- Accordingly ^—they--instructed-
the Director of Representation and Public Employment Practices not to 
process the two- matters herein until the Supreme Court rules on the 
motion for certiorari. 
Board Chairman Newman dissented from this position. He indicated that 
the Taylor Law is a comprehensive statute designed to foster harmonious 
labor relations, that this was recognized by the Second Circuit in its 
decision, and that consistent with that decision, this Board has juris-
diction over the petition and the application herein. 
The next meeting of the Board will be held on June 18-19, 1981 at its Albany office. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ann Pociluk 
Secretary to the Board 
#lA-6/5/81 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 580, 
Respondent., 
-and-
PERRY TARQUINIO, 
Charging Party. 
BLITMAN AND KING, for Respondent 
PERRY TARQUINIO, Pro Se 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4809 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), Division 580, to the decision 
of a hearing officer that it violated its duty of fair repre-
sentation toward* Perry Tarquinio In that it refused to process 
a grievance against Tarquinio's employer, the Central New York 
Regional Transportation Authority (Centro). The grievance 
alleged that Tarquinio was not accorded proper seniority 
regarding his choice of vacation time. 
FACTS 
Tarquinio was originally hired by Centro in September 1963. 
He was released in May 1966 and then re-hired a year later 
through the efforts of Kulas, who was then ATU's business agent. 
The terms of his re-hiring did not specify its effect on senior-
ity. In practice, however, Tarquinio's seniority was dated 
from 1963 for choice of vacation time, but from 1967 for bids'for 
Board - U-4809 
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bus runs. This was noted by us in an earlier decision (12 PERB 
1] 
113013 [1979]). 
Tarquinio continued to bid for vacation on the basis of 
1963 seniority until 1979. In 1979, Centro let ATU manage the 
vacation sign-up procedure. Both Tarquinio and another employee 
signed up for the same vacation period „_ The other employee was 
an ATU member. His seniority dated to a later time than Tarquinio!s 
claimed date, but ATU, acting on behalf of Centro, awarded the 
vacation period to the other employee. Tarquinio then filed a 
grievance with Centro, but ATU persuaded Centro to deny the griev-
ance at the first step and it refused to process the grievance 
further. Indeed, ATU rejected Centro"s offer to create an extra 
vacation slot which would have permitted both Tarquinio and the 
other employee to take simultaneous vacations. 
1] The earlier decision was on a charge by Tarquinio that ATU 
did not represent him fairly when he sought seniority from 
1963 for bus run bids. At the time of that charge, Tarquinio 
had quit ATU. This Board dismissed the earlier charge on the 
ground that it was not timely; ATU had decided not to support 
his claim for seniority in April 1975 and he brought his 
charge in March 1978. The decision states: 
"Perry Tarquinio was first employed as a bus driver 
in 1963. His employment was terminated in 1966, 
but he was rehired in 1967. The conditions of 
his reemployment were that he be on probation for 
an unspecified time and that his seniority rights 
be determined at a later date. Shortly thereafter, 
his seniority for vacation purposes was restored 
to the date of his original employment, but his 
seniority for bidding on bus runs was determined 
to run from his reemployment in 1967." 
6927 
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Tarquinio complained that ATU's position on his grievance 
discriminated against him because he was not an ATU member„ He 
also complained that the union behaved in an irresponsible manner 
in that it did not investigate the basis of his grievance„ In 
support of this position, he introduced evidence showing that 
Kulas, ATU's former business agent, Fiermonte, the former record-
ing secretary of ATU, and Calabrese, the Assistant Manager, of 
Centro, all corroborated his understanding that his seniority for 
vacation purposes dated from 1963„ 
ATU introduced no evidence„ Instead, it relied upon a 
motion to dismiss which it supported by the argument that the 
Board's1, decision in the earlier case disposed of the matter„ 
This argument did not persuade the hearing officer, and she 
decided the case in favor of Tarquinio. 
ATU now asks this Board to reopen the hearing because it 
had not been represented by an attorney„ It also complains that 
the hearing officer determined Tarquiniofs seniority for vacation 
purposes, a matter which involved-\ the collective bargaining 
contract dispute and which, therefore, should have been resolved 
by grievance arbitration,, The exceptions do not address the 
merits of the hearing officer's decision that ATU discriminated 
against Tarquinio„ 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law of 
the hearing officer„ 
6928 
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The exceptions do not provide any basis for a reopening 
of the hearing. They do not allege that ATU was denied an 
opportunity to be represented by an attorney, but that it chose 
not to be so represented. Whether or not it could have presented 
a more effective defense of its conduct had it chosen to be repre-
sented by an attorney at the hearing is irrelevant to the merits 
~ 6 l : ~ i t : s ~ ~ T ~ e q u e ^ — -
be decided on the actual record made by the parties. 
ATU's second argument is a challenge to the hearing officer's 
proposed remedy that Tarquinio's seniority for vacation be dated 
from 1963o The hearing officer did not interpret ATU's contract 
with Centro in ascertaining the date of Tarquinio's seniority for 
vacation. That contract is silent on the matter. The hearing 
Dfficer determined that Tarquinio had been bidding for vacation 
time on the basis of 1963 seniority ever since May 1967 and that 
this was a sufficient basis for his being permitted to continue 
to do so. In any event, even if there is some uncertainty as to 
whether Tarquinio's grievance would have been found meritorious 
had it gone to grievance arbitration, that uncertainty is a direct 
result of the unlawful discriminatory action of ATU in refusing 
to advance the grievance. If in the determination of an appro-
priate remedy there must be a resolution of an uncertainty con-
cerning the merits of Tarquinio's grievance, it is proper to 
resolve the question in favor of the injured employee and not the 
wrongdoer. Laborers International' Union, Local 324, 234 NLRB 367 
(1978), 
ATU was the wrongdoer in refusing to process Tarquinio's grievance. Its 
wrongful conduct is underscored by the fact that the decision denying 
Tarquinio his preferred vacation time was made by ATU. Indeed, 
Board - U-4809 -5 
ATU persuaded Centro not to cr eat'e'-an. extra, vacation slot 
which would have permitted Tarquinio to take his vacation when he 
wanted it„ A union must be particularly sensitive about its con-
duct when, in the exercise of a responsibility it performs on 
behalf of the employer, it denies a claimed benefit to an employee; 
it must be particularly conscientious in its representation of a 
grieyant who complains about its own action„ 
Division 580, to: 
1. Promptly communicate to Centro that it no longer 
objects to Tarquinio's vacation bidding seniority 
date of September 10, 1963„ 
20 Adjust Tarquinio's vacation periods for 1981 to 
those to which he would otherwise be entitled based 
on a seniority date of September 10, 1963„ 
30 Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining 
or coercing public employees in the exercise of 
rights granted in Section 202 of the Act, or 
attempting to cause a public employer to do so„ 
40 Post the attached notice. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 5, 1981 
'll&#ZjP £//j2+ 
Harold R„ Newman, Chairman 
%Uu fctatsUA^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David Co Randies,'Member 
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•PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AMD ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE-
PUBLIC; EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARI 
^ ^ ^ _ - ^ . . _ and in order to effectuate Shs poiicjes of the __ 
' NEW YORK STATE 
. -PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify a l l employees that: ' 
3.. 
ATU does not object to Perry Tarquinio's 
seniority date for vacation bidding 
purposes as being September 10,.1963. 
Perry Tarquinio's vacation periods for 
1981 will be adjusted to those to which 
he would beventitled based on a seniority 
date of September l'0, 1963'. 
ATU will not interfere with, restrain 
or coerce public employees in the 
exercise of rights protected'by §202 
of the Act and will not attempt to 
cause a public employer to do so. 
&a«od. 
Employee Organization' 
By. (RajsrencniatWe) (TSile) 
This Notice must lenmin posiotf ior 30 canseculh'o days Irom the (Sato ui pustiiuj, and i.O'-st uoi bo ;slinr;-J 
dviticod, or u-<jvi','frt/ 'ay any olhtir nirUcrisI. , : 
. 6931 ' 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
ELMIRA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, : BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
AFL-CIO, ' : 
Respondent, Case No. U-4699 
-and-
GENE CARR, 
Charging Party. 
PAUL S. MAYO, for Respondent 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Gene Carr to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing his charge that the Elmira 
Teachers Association (Association) violated Its duty of fair rep-
resentation toward, him. by providing him with merely perfunctory 
representation when it presented his grievance to an arbitrator. 
The grievance was that the school district had wrongly denied Carr 
an incremental salary step credit for his prior military service. 
It is acknowledged that Carr had served in the Armed.Forces 
of the United States before taking employment with the Elmira City 
School District (District). At one time, employees of the Dis-
trict with prior military service were given an incremental salary 
3. j S "J 
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stepo This practice may, or may not, have been discontinued by 
the time Carr became an employee of the District, but, in any 
event, the incremental salary step was denied to him. The denial 
was communicated to Carr in a letter from the Assistant Superin-
tendent of the District, dated March 16, 1978, which informed him 
~ th at -theJ m cr emental-• s atar y step ~ ere dirt-wasL no t —b ein-g- -g-r an-te-d—to — 
new employeeso The letter also stated that the matter had been 
discussed with Watnik, who was the grievance chairman of the 
Association,, at that time. 
Carr discussed the matter with Watnik, but he did not ini-
tiate a grievance at that time„ Subsequently, in November 1978 
according to Carr, and in April 1979 according to McMordie 
(Watnik's successor as grievance chairman), Carr complained 
about the denial of the increment„ In either case, the complaint 
was made more than 45 days after the March 16, 1978 letter„ 
The collective bargaining agreement between the District and the 
Association set a 45-day limit for the filing of grievances., 
Notwithstanding the 45-day limitation, a grievance was 
filed by the Association on May 15, 1979 on Carr's behalf, and it 
was eventually brought to arbitration» The arbitrator denied the 
grievance on the ground, urged by the District, that it had not 
been timely filed. In his award, the arbitrator also noted the 
testimony of Watnik, a District witness, supporting the District's 
statement that the Association had previously agreed to the 
elimination of incremental step credit for newly hired employees 
who had prior military service0 
Board - U-4699 
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Carr did not, in his charge, assert that his grievance was 
timely filed or that the Association was responsible for the late 
filing. His charge that the Association violated its duty of fair 
representation is based on his allegation that the Association had 
not been sufficiently diligent in its preparation of the grievance 
and was, therefore, unable to refute Watnik's incorrect testimony 
that it had agreed to the elimination of the military service in-
crement. Without reaching the question whether Carr's allegation 
was factually correct, the hearing officer dismissed the charge 
on the ground that the Association's diligence was irrelevant be-
cause Carr's grievance would, in any event, have been lost by rea-
son of not being timely filed. 
In support of his exceptions, Carr contends that the time-
liness or lack of timeliness of the initiation of the grievance is 
irrelevant to the Association's obligation to prepare its case 
diligently, and that it did not meet this obligation. In effect, 
he is arguing that an employee organization violates its. duty of 
fair representation if it processes even a fundamentally defective 
grievance in a perfunctory fashion. 
DISCUSSION 
The exceptions herein must be dismissed for lack of merit, 
tfe find that the conduct of the Association was not improper. We 
cannot ignore the basic fact that •.Carres•••• grievance was fatally 
defective because it was not timely filed, and that this defect is 
Board - U-4699 -4 
attributable to him and not to the Association. While the Asso-
ciation took Carr's grievance to arbitration in the hope of pos-
sibly prevailing on the merits as to the incremental salary step 
for his prior military service, it must have known that the Dis-
trict could defeat the grievance by pleading the fatal defect. It 
should not be penalized for taking the chance in the grievant's 
behalf that the defect barring consideration of the grievance 
might somehow be overlooked. 
In all fairness, an employee organization should not be 
held to the same standard of care and effort in.preparing for the 
presentation of a grievance that, through no fault on its part, 
is fundamentally defective when brought to it as it would other-
wise be. Clearly a grievant suffers no prejudice if his employee 
organization processes a fundamentally defective grievance in a 
perfunctory manner, as the likelihood of success is not affected 
by the diligence of its preparation.— Thus, we do not find that 
the Association was grossly negligent or irresponsible when it 
prepared for the presentation of the case to the arbitrator. 
Accordingly, by the standard enunciated in Brighton Transporta-
tion Association, 10 PERB 1f3090 (1977) , the Association cannot 
be found to have violated its duty of fair representation. 
TJ See Siskey v. Teamsters Local 261, 419 F.Supp. 48, •:".. 
(Western District, Pa. 1976); 93 LPvSM 2200 
6935 i 
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The determination that the Association's conduct was not 
improper is consistent with the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 US 171, 191 (1967), 64 LRRM 2369, 2377; and 
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 US 554 (1976), 91 LRRM 
2481, that a union .should not arbitrarily ignore a^meritprious 
grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion. The Court was 
concerned with meritorious grievances having a reasonable likeli-
hood of success if conscientiously pursued and presented. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
June 5, 1981 
' U ^ - v - ^ l A T> \TVvr ™ JZ^. CUr. • 
'4£<*cS7^*+. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^ 
2&. i ^ -
I d a K l a u s , Member 
David C." R a n d i e s , Mejrfber 
6.A *"&*"* 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
..-._._;,__ _L_".:._!.:;:..._.-_ -and" _. _.. _ 
ROCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4346 
ADAM D. KAUFMAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
RUBEN CIRILLO, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Rochester 
City School District (District) to a hearing officer's decision 
that it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the 
Rochester Teachers Association (Association) as to the terms and 
conditions of employment of certain per diem substitutes. 
In settlement of representation case C-1679, the District 
and the Association reached an agreement on October 12, 1978, 
pursuant to which the Association withdrew its petition and the 
District recognized the Association as the representative of a 
negotiating unit of "all those per diem substitute teachers who, 
on or before the end of the first payroll period of May, have 
worked 36 full days during the current school year". The agree-
ment further provided that they would commence negotiations for 
a collective bargaining contract that would take effect on 
September 1, 1979 "with the understanding that such contract 
will not be retroactive". Thereafter, the Association initiated 
a request for negotiations and received no response from the 
Board - U-4346 
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District. On these facts, the hearing offie er determined that the 
District violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the 
Association. 
In its exceptions, the District argues that, notwithstanding 
its recognition of the Association, it is not required to negotiate 
the terms and conditions of employment of per diem substitutes 
because they are not employees within the meaning of the Taylor 
Law. It asserts that the pool of per diem substitute teachers was 
increased, thereby diminishing the number of hours worked by each 
per diem substitute. The effect of this is that many per diem sub-
stitutes who had worked 36 days during the 1977-78 school year, 
now work less. These per diem substitutes, according to the Dis-
trict, are casual workers and it is' ultra' vires the authority of 
PEE.B to compel it to negotiate with them. Based upon this argu-
ment, the District complains that it would be unreasonably incon-
venienced if it were required to negotiate an agreement covering 
per diem substitutes and then to wait until seven months before 
the expiration of that agreement before seeking to decertify the 
Association. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the determination of the hearing officer that the 
District violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the 
Association and his order directing it to do so. Unlike employees 
of the organized state militia and assistant district attorneys, 
among others, per diem substitutes are not explicitly excluded 
69; 
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from Taylor Law coverage. Per diem substitutes have been excluded 
by the Board from coverage on a case-by-case basis on the ground 
that they were shown to be casual workers and therefore did not 
have a sufficiently significant employment relationship to warrant 
their inclusion in a negotiating unit and the grant to them of 
statutory representation status. Others, however, have been found 
to be employed with sufficient regularity to be granted such 
status. Thus, resolution of perldiem substitute representation 
status depends upon the particular nature of their employment re-
lationship.— 
Rather than litigating the issue of the right of its per 
diem substitutes to representation status, the District recognized 
the Association as the representative of an identifiable group of 
such teachers. There has been no determination that these per 
diem substitutes are now ineligible for representation status and 
there is no reason for believing them to be ineligible. As we 
have noted, nothing in the language of the Taylor Law precludes 
the granting of representation status to per diem substitutes, as 
such. We therefore find that as of this time the per diem substi-
tutes included in the negotiating unit covered by the District's 
recognition are employees within the meaning of the Taylor Law. 
1/ In Buffalo Board of Education, 13 PERB 1(3073 (1980), we re-
manded the case to the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) to ascertain whether an identi-
fiable group of per diem substitutes had a sufficient employ-
ment relationship with the employer to be certified. In Board 
of Education of the City of New York, 10 PERB 114043 (1977), 
the Director included "otEer-than-occasional" per diem substi-
tutes in pedagogical units. (The matter did not come before 
this Board because no exceptions were filed.) 
Board - U-4346 -4 
In resolving the issue before us, we have looked to the 
conflicting policy considerations raised by the parties. The 
District asserts that it would be inconvenienced if it had to 
negotiate an agreement with the Association and then, after 
waiting until seven months prior to the expiration of that agree-
ment, it successfully petitioned for decertification of the Asso-
ciation on the ground that the employees were ineligible for 
representation status. Against this speculative inconvenience, 
we must consider the fact that the employees would be deprived 
of a statutory right to be represented in negotiations by their 
duly recognized negotiating representative^/ if the Association 
were now denied the opportunity to negotiate by having to liti-
gate its representation status at this time. Clearly the statu-
tory concern for the right of the employees to be represented 
in negotiations is paramount'.: to the speculative concern for the 
inconvenience that such negotiations might cause the District. 
Neither second thoughts by the District as to the appropriateness 
of the negotiating unit for which it retognized the Association, 
y 
Section 204.3 of the Taylor Law provides that public em-
ployers shall negotiate with recognized employee organi-
zations. 
6040 
Board - U-4346 -5 
nor changes in the composition of that unit, should relieve the 
District of its obligation to negotiate with the Association.—' 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Rochester City School 
- .. : :: _D_l.SitXlC-t : ;. - .._.._
 ;__ _. 
1. On demand, to negotiate in good faith with 
the Rochester Teachers Association concerning 
the terms and conditions of employment of 
per diem substitute teachers in the negotiating 
unit; and 
2. To conspicuously post the attached notice at 
all work locations in places normally used 
2/ 
In New York City Board of Education, 7 PERB 13Q22 (1977), 
the employer had recognized a union as the representative 
of a unit of community service attendants, Thereafter, it 
asserted that it was free not to negotiate with : the union 
because there had been a high turnover among the employees 
in the unit and, more importantly, because many of the new 
employees were students and, therefore, not employees within 
the meaning of the Taylor Law. This Board did not permit 
the employer to repudiate its recognition of the union and 
ordered it to negotiate in good faith with the union. 
6941 
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to communicate with its employees 
Dated, New York, New York 
June 5, 1981 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
s&^l^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
\JP &,> JiCAtf 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
L ^^_z ^ _i: i___^ and in order to effectuate the policies of the ;___!_____: ___'_ 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: 
We will, on demand, negotiate in good faith with-the 
Rochester Teachers Association concerning the terms 
and conditions of employment of per diem substitute 
teachers' in the negotiating unit. 
Rochest.er. City..School.Distr.icfc . 
Employer 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
mm 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., NIAGARA CHAPTER, 
Respondent, 
-and-
JAT«!EL_O.F_JiIAGAEA.,...__...._ „ , ,-_ 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS CHRISTY, for Respondent 
NEGOTIATION CONSULTANTS AND CO., 
(EARL C. KNIGHT, of Counsel) for 
Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of 
Niagara (Town) to the decision of a hearing officer dismissing 
several specifications of its charge that the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Niagara Chapter (CSEA) violated its 
duty to negotiate in good faith by insisting upon the negotiation 
of nonmandatory subjects of negotiation.— The first of the Town's 
exceptions is directed to CSEA's demand that §1 of Article XV of 
the old contract be continued. That section deals with employee 
retirement and has provided: 
"The employer shall take the necessary steps to 
adopt and.make effective March 16, 1970, the 
l/60th plan of the New York State Retirement System. 
1/ The charge alleged that nineteen of the demands presented by 
CSEA were not mandatory subjects of negotiation. The hearing 
officer determined that ten of the nineteen demands were not 
mandatory, that eight of them were mandatory, and that one of 
them was partially mandatory and partially nonmandatory. CSEA 
filed no exceptions to those of its demands found to be non-
mandatory subjects of negotiation. The Town's exceptions are 
directed to four of the demands found to be mandatory subjects 
of negotiation. We do not consider any of the findings of the 
hearing officer to which no exceptions were directed. 
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Such plan shall be fully paid for by the employer 
and shall be available to all employees covered by 
this contract. Employees who wish to contribute a 
greater amount than that provided for, shall make 
a proposal in writing to the Supervisor's office." 
(emphasis supplied) 
The Town argues that the demand is not a mandatory subj ect 
of negotiation because the underscored language violates State 
law. This position is correct. Article 14 of the Retirement and 
-So c ial„£eeur ity. .Law.. pr.o^ides.. a.^ sp eci -f ie,::_r.et.ir.ement,_ plan., fox.^pub 1 ie 
employees, other than police and firefighters, who are hired after 
July 1, 1976. This plan calls for contributions of 3% by the 
2/ public employer— We, therefore, reverse the decision of the 
hearing officer that §1 of old Article XV of the parties' collec-
tive bargaining contract is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
The Town's second exception is directed to CSEA's proposal 
for an amendment to §1 of Article XV, which would deal with 
retirement benefits for policemen. This demand provides: 
"Change 60 plan for policemen to special (20) 
year plan (Section 384d) .•" 
The Town-.does -hot' .asserur:that there; is..anything 'in- this demand 
which would make it a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. It 
contends that the demand is nonmandatory because it is for an 
amendment of the existing Article XV, §1, and that the existing 
provision and the proposed change constitute a unitary demand. 
Thus, it is nonmandatory because the existing contract provision 
2/ Section 201.4 of the Taylor Law as amended by L.1973, c.382, 
§6 prohibits the negotiation of' retirement benefits. However 
an exception to this is specified in L.1975, c.625, §6 which 
permits the negotiation of retirement benefits which do not 
require approval by the State Legislature. Employer paid 
retirement coverage is a benefit which does not require 
approval by the State Legislature. However, public employees 
who have become members of a public retirement system on or 
after July 1, 1976, are required by R, & S. S." Law :Art•'. 14 to 
contribute three percent of their annual wages to the retire-
ment system in which they have membership. 
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3/ is nonmandatory.— We find no unitary demand here. The proposed 
change in Article XV, §1 for policemen and. the continuation of its 
existing language for other employees were presented to the Town 
as separate demands. 
The Town's third exception is to the hearing officer's 
determination that the first sentence of the newly proposed 
Art_ij:JLe_:^ iy^ ._._;§2..,_^  
with overtime, §2 provides: 
"All policemen on an hourly basis will be 
entitled to the same overtime benefits as 
employees in other departments (time and a half 
for all hours over forty). Overtime shall first 
be offered to full-time employees and then to 
part-time employees if no full-time employees 
are available." 
The hearing officer ruled that the first sentence is concerned 
with the rate of compensation and is, therefore, a mandatory 
subject of negotiation, while the second sentence is not a manda-
tory subject of negotiation because it establishes a procedure fdr 
employee bidding for overtime work that would be applicable to 
both unit employees and to non-unit employees. The Town argues 
that the first and second sentences constitute a unitary demand 
which must be declared nonmandatory because one part of it is non-
mandatory. We agree. 
The last determination of the hearing officer that is dealt 
with in the Town's exceptions i's- an unnumbered new proposal entitlejd 
"Safety and Health Maintenance". It provides: 
3/ In Town of Haver straw, 11 PERB 1(3109 (1978) , we held that a 
contract demand which contains both mandatory and nonmandatory 
elements is not a mandatory subject of negotiation if the 
various elements were presented as a unit. 
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"The Employer agrees to endeavor to provide safety 
standards for the protection of employees' well-
being commensurate with those presently in effect 
in the private sector and to provide and maintain 
safe and healthful working conditions and to initiate 
and maintain operating practices that will safeguard 
employees." 
The objection of the Town to this demand is that it is too vague. 
Citing our decision in White Plains Professional Firefighters 
Association,, 1LPERB J[3089. (1978>, the_ hearing off i car rulecL_^ that 
the vagueness of the demand does not render it a nonmandatory sub-
ject of negotiation. We affirm this ruling. 
In addition to its objections to the determination by the 
hearing officer that specific demands were mandatory subjects of 
negotiation, the Town also argues that eleven of the nineteen 
demands of CSEA, all of which were for verbatim continuation of 
prior contract provisions, should be declared nonmandatory because 
as a group they constitute a unitary demand, some parts of which 
are nonmandatory. We reject this argument. There is no basis 
for concluding that the eleven provisions were presented as a 
unitary demand. While CSEA •/did assert that each of the eleven 
provisions of the old contract was a mandatory subject of negoti-
ation, it did not insist that they be negotiated as a single, 
indivisible package. On the contrary, it proposed changes of its 
own in the existing contract. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER CSEA to negotiate in good faith by 
withdrawing its demand for the continuation, 
of Article XV, §1 as it existed in the prior 
agreement and for new Article XXIV ,• .§2, and 
WE FURTHER ORDER that in other respects the exceptions 
mm 
Board - U-5115 
herein he, and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 5, 1981 
/£ A£. a-t^g tr 4^^,^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
***,•£& 
Ida Klaus, Member 
<jUOd~-
David C. R a n d i e s , Membe 
m 
